Corporate Management as a Locus of Power by Ruml, Beardsley
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3 Article 2
June 1951
Corporate Management as a Locus of Power
Beardsley Ruml
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beardsley Ruml, Corporate Management as a Locus of Power, 29 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 228 (1951).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol29/iss3/2
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AS A LOCUS OF POWER
BEARDSLEY RUMVIL*
T nII WORLD CRISIS of the twentieth century, which has had its
most recent violent manifestation in the Korean affair, springs
as we all know from ideological conflicts of the most profound
character. These conflicts pertain to the nature of the individual,
the nature of truth, and the question as to the existence of good
and evil. The fact of the crisis has caused the Western democ-
racies to re-examine their political, social and economic institu-
tions and in this re-examination many inconsistencies have been
found which are being gradually but definitely reconciled. One of
the areas of re-examination has been that of business enterprise
as it affects the dignity and freedom of the individual. In this
setting, this discussion is presented.
Business is one of the most pervasive facts of modern life.
Practically everybody who lives in a city, town, or village does
business with business several times a day, and practically every-
body else has something to do with business many, many times
in every year. We depend on business for the things we eat
and wear, for the home we live in, for most of our amusements
and recreation, for going places and knowing what is going on
in the world. Most of us depend on business for the kind of
jobs we have. Many of us own some part of a business or re-
ceive some income from lending business our savings. Business
is so common that we take it for granted and use it without think-
ing much about it, just as we do any other familiar facility.
What is it that business does in our complicated modern
world? First, and primarily, it is the job of business to get things
ready for use. Second, in doing this work of production and dis-
tribution, business concurrently provides people with productive
* An address delivered at a joint luncheon of the Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law and the Section of Taxation, of the American Bar Association,
at Washington, D. C., September 19, 1950. Reprinted with permission from Pro-
ceedings of Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 1950, American
Bar Association, Chicago, pp. 67-77.
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activity-something useful to do-and a social setting in which
to do it. Third, and finally, business makes a place where the in-
evitable savings of the people can be put to work.
How does business do these things? A business does these
things by making rules, enforcing its rules when possible, and
compromising them when necessary.
It is in no sense a figure of speech to refer to a business com-
pany as a private government. A business is a government be-
cause within the law it is authorized and organized to make rules
for the conduct of its affairs. It is a private government because
the rules it makes within the law are final and not reviewable
by any public body. Some might say that the reason a business
is a private government is because it is owned by private indivi-
duals, but it seems to me that the existence of private authority is
more significant than the element of ownership. It is important
to note that this private government, the corporation, or busi-
ness, existing through the authority of the public government, is
in no sense an interloper. On the contrary, it is the method we
have chosen by which to get done, for the welfare of all of us,
the work it is for private business to do.
A business carries on its operations through a multitude of
decisions under its own rules. The rules made by a business to
govern its operations must not be inconsistent with the law of
national, state, and local governments from which it derives its
authority and from which it receives protection. However, with-
in the law, a business has great latitude in the rules it makes and
in their enforcement.
I. THEB GOVERNED
If business is private government, who are the governed?
We are the governed! We are governed by business in one or all
of four possible capacities: (1) as stockholder, (2) as vendor or
supplier, (3) as customer, or (4) as employee.
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A. THL STOCKHOLDER
Let us take these four capacities in which any of us may
stand in relation to business and examine them. In what sense
is the stockholder subject to the rule-making powers of the busi-
ness in which he has placed his savings? One might have thought
that it would have been the other way around, that the stockhold-
ers, being the owners, would have the rule-making power instead
of being subjected to it. The stockholders collectively elect a
board of directors, and the board of directors elects a manage-
ment. At the time of an election, the stockholders have the legal
right to change the directors and hence to change the managers.
They also have the right to vote on specific rules for the running
of the business that may have been proposed in a proxy state-
ment. But, except at the time and place of a stockholders' meet-
ing, the stockholders ordinarily have no rule-making power. A
large stockholder may have large influence on the rules that the
managers adopt. This influence may come as a result of the
power he may exercise at a later meeting of stockholders, or it
may be deference by the managers to a holder of property in the
business. A small stockholder also may have large influence if
his suggestions are helpful to the management. Access to man-
agement for the expression of ideas and criticism is frequently
available to the smallest stockholder.
The freedom of the company in taking actions affecting the
interests of stockholders is subject to legal limitations that ex-
perience has shown to be desirable, and the stockholder may go
to the courts to enforce his legal rights. But the enforcement
of legal rights is not the same thing as the power to make rules.
It is only the power of protection against illegal rules.
Under the private government of business, the stockholders
are definitely among the governed, even though they may choose
the boards of directors under whose authority the rules affecting
them are made. Their position is something like that of the citi-
zens of the State of Illinois, or any other, who vote for the sena-
tors and representatives who pass the laws which they in turn obey.
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The laws regulating corporations are intended to give basic
protection to the stockholders against business rule-makers, just
as our constitutional rights are intended to protect us as citi-
zens against the law-making and law-enforcing agencies of public
bodies-federal, state, and local. In addition to the laws, the
stockholder has a final safeguard against business rule-making
that he may find uncongenial-he may sell his stock. True, he
may not be able to sell his holdings for as much as he paid for
them. And, if he wants an income on his savings, he may become
a stockholder-citizen under another business government which
may please him little better or no better at all. Nevertheless, he
can free himself at a price if he wishes; he is not locked in. The
company he keeps, he keeps by choice.
B. THE VENDORS
The second group among those governed under the rule-mak-
ing of business are the vendors or suppliers of raw or semi-
finished materials, manufactured articles for resale, or services
of one kind or another, utilities, transportation, and the like. The
vendors are usually, but not always, other businesses which are
making rules of their own for the business which is to them a
customer.
The rules applying to vendors cover all the, specifications
made by the purchaser on the things that are purchased, the
price that will be paid, when it will be paid, the quantities, quali-
ties, and nature of the things supplied, the date of delivery, pro-
visions for return of damaged or unwanted goods, restrictions on
the sale to others, and all the rest. The contract or understand-
ing in which these terms are embodied is like a treaty between
two sovereign states. In entering into such a business treaty,
both parties give up in some measure their freedom of subse-
quent action. They give it up because it is advantageous as com-
pared with the alternative of making no arrangement at all.
Under ideal conditions, each business that is a party to a con-
tract accedes willingly to the rules imposed by the other. Such
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conditions are met most fully when the vendor has some other in-
dependent company to whom he can sell his goods if he wishes,
and when Company X has another independent source from which
it can supply its needs. It is then possible to discuss terms in a
spirit of give-and-take, and to reach a compromise which, at
the moment of decision at any event, seemed the best choice among
real alternative possibilities.
Such equal conditions are not uncommon in the relations of
one business to another. Yet inequality of bargaining power will
always exist; when it is too great, imposed terms may be the
result. The use of force is just as ugly in establishing the rules
of a business contract as it is anywhere else. The coerced con-
tract is of course resented in business, but it is not considered
a wrong business practice. Many businessmen, large and small,
welcome situations in which they are on the upper side of a busi-
ness squeeze, and their resentment when they are on the lower
side is not taken too seriously by their colleagues who happen
to be spectators for the moment.
As a matter of fact, one test of survival efficiency in business
consists in not being subjected to coercion too frequently or too
severely at any one time. The last coerced act on a business is
the step just next to bankruptcy. The inefficient or unwanted
business cannot be protected from rule by force, because its own
nature determines that it shall be weak when another is strong.
C. THE CUSTOMERS
The third group of the governed are the customers. The
businesses which are customers of other businesses we have dealt
with in our consideration of vendors. Most customers, the tens
of millions of them, are individuals buying things and services
at retail. Superficially, the individual customer seems to be at
a great disadvantage in being subjected to the decisions of busi-
ness management as to what he shall be offered, where and when
he can get it, and how much he will have to pay for it. The busi-
ness management can make its rules and back them up with ad-
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ministrative organization, physical plant and equipment, money
in the bank, and propaganda.
But the inequality is not so great as it appears-in fact, the
strength may be with David Consumer if he does not have to
buy, or can postpone his buying, or can find something else that
will do, or some other place to get it. Then the imposing prop-
erty and organization and resources of the Goliath Corporation
become clumsy handicaps before David's power of choice. The
company and its rule-making managers find themselves faced with
a debilitating condition called "idle plant expense." Idle plant
expense will slowly but surely force the business rule-makers to
modify their rules to meet the views of the governed.
Does this mean that the customers make the rules? Not at
all. It only means that when the customers have the power of
choice, the rules that are made will be acceptable to them. Busi-
ness management will still decide what will be offered and when
and where and for how much. Neither individually nor collectively
do customers have the ability to make rules or to enforce them.
But collectively the customers determine what rules shall in the
end survive.
The customer requires the aid of public government in order
to make his power of choice worth anything to him. This aid
takes the form of giving him the information he needs as to what
is available and at what price. Laws covering labeling, misbrand-
ing, and the like are all measures that strengthen the effectiveness
of customer choice. When there is no choice to the customer,
when a single company is the only source of supply, as is true
of telephone service or electricity or sometimes transportation,
the customer is helpless if the product or service is indispensable
for health and comfort. In these cases of natural or artificial
monopoly, the more important rules of the company affecting the
customer are regulated by public government.
D. THE WORKERS
The fourth group of people governed by private business are
the employees, all of them. The president of the company, the
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vice-presidents, the deputies and assistants, the superintendents
and managers, foremen, bosses, and workers-male and female,
part-time and full-time, employed or unemployed-all are gov-
erned by the rule-making of private business. Some of these
governed are themselves subordinate rule-makers, promulgating
codes and issuing instructions with the authority of the business-
state by which they are employed. For most people, the rules
that most intimately affect their lives are made by their employers.
Most of the employed and of those who wish to be employed, but
are not, look to private business for employment. The rules af-
fecting employment made by private business are therefore of
paramount importance to the individual. These rules determine
for the individual where he shall work, when he shall work,
what he shall do, who will give him orders, who will take orders
from him, his promotion and discipline, the amount he gets paid,
and the time and duration of his holidays and vacations.
The employees, all of them, are weak as compared with the
company that makes the rules and enforces them. To compensate
for this weakness, we must look to three off-setting balances.
The first is the labor laws of public government, the second is
the trade union or other private organization of employees, and the
third is the chance of getting a job working for some other com-
pany or of getting by without doing any work at all. But neither la-
bor laws nor trade unions can do more than give the broad frame-
work of conditions of employment and occasional protection to'
the individual in extreme cases of maladministration. Just as the
true strength of the customer in the apparently unequal nego-
tiation with the business company was found in the ability of the
customer to go elsewhere to do his business, so too the strength
of the employee lies in his ability, when he has it, to get another
job from another employer or to get along without doing any
work. The laws and the unions may help provide a basic set-
ting for private business rule-making, but they can never do
enough to give to the employee a real feeling that in conforming
to the rules affecting him he has exercised responsible free choice.
Even for the executive, the ability to get a job elsewhere and the
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courage to do it are the only conditions under which subjection
to business rule-making is supportable by free men. It is obvious
that under the large-scale unemployment of the 1930's, the reality
of freedom, guaranteed politically, under the Constitution, was ac-
tually lost under the economic exigencies of the period. It was
lost, not because business set out to destroy it, but because where
there is no choice of rule-makers, as under mass unemployment,
no rule however beneficent can be accepted by the individual as a
matter of responsible consent. The economic system as a whole
coerces him even though the particular employing company does
not intend to do so.
Thus we see the tolerable freedom of the governed under
the private rule-making of business, of the stockholders, of the
vendors, of the customers, and of the employees of all rank comes
from the opportunity of all to say, "No! I will do my business
with another business." When the governed man can say "No,"
he has powers as great as those of the strongest business.
II. THE Govxoas.
To find out realistically how things happen, let us, the gov-
erned, approach a business from the outside and work our way in.
We can come at the business either as an employee, a vendor, a
customer, or a stockholder. From whatever point we come, we
run into an employee whose job it is to attend to us. If we are
looking for work, we see an employee of the employment depart-
ment; if we call to discuss the job we have now, we talk to the
executive to whom we are responsible. If we are a vendor with
something we want to sell to the company, our first contact is
with a representative of the purchasing agent, or the buying of-
fice. If we are a customer and wish to buy something for our-
selves, or if we wish to discuss something we have already bought,
we meet a salesman or an adjuster. If we are a stockholder, we
first talk to an assistant treasurer, or an assistant secretary, or an
assistant to the president. In every case, we find that the com-
pany is represented by a subordinate someone who has authority
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to make certain decisions. In every case, the someone who rep-
resents the company gets his authority from a superior source in
the company's management, a source which combines legisla-
tive, administrative, and judicial powers. This superior execu-
tive may be overruled by an executive superior to him unless he
himself happens to be the chief executive. From whatever angle
we approach a business, as we rise higher and higher through the
levels of authority, we finally come to a chief executive who is
usually the president of the company.
A. MANAGERIAL OFFICERS
In most things in a business the president is the boss. Work-
ing through his subordinates, he gets done the things that have
to be done. In many cases he also decides on the policies that
will be followed in doing them. He can buy and sell, hire and
fire, construct or tear down. Among the few things he cannot
do by himself are to declare a dividend, open a bank account for
the company, sell its securities to the public, or dissolve the
business. Nor can he appoint himself to his own job.
Sometimes a company has an officer who is called chairman of
the board. The powers and duties of a chairman do not follow a
consistent pattern. In general, the powers over policy that are
reserved from the president, and are not reserved to the board of
directors, are exercised by the chairman. The chairman has par-
ticular supervisory responsibilities including observation of the
work of the president. It is doubtful if the chairman would give
instructions to the president as to how he should operate the
company even if he had the power to do so. If he did give such
instructions, he would himself be the chief administrative officer
under another name, and the president would then be his assist-
ant. What is important is to realize that there are two related,
separable, top functions: (1) that of long-time policy-planning
with broad consideration of the company's relations to trends
within the industry, in other industries, in the government, and
in international affairs, and (2) that of day-by-day central co-
ordination of operating decisions covering every phase of doing
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efficiently the things it is the business of the company to do. In
many companies, these two functions are carried on by one person.
B. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The powers that are withheld from the president and chair-
man, or chief executive officer under whatever title, are held by
the board of directors.
Where does the board of directors get its powers? They
come from the laws of the state in which the company gets its
charter to do business. These laws specify what things the board
of directors may do and what things are reserved even from them
to the stockholders. But since stockholders ordinarily have no
powers except at a stockholders' meeting-and such meetings are
infrequent and special meetings are hard to call without the con-
sent of the directors-for practically all purposes, the board of
directors is supreme. This description of where the power in a
company is located is reasonably realistic with one exception, and
here the situation differs greatly from company to company. The
president or chairman of a company generally recommends to the
board of directors what he thinks the board should do even in
the field of the board's own powers. In some companies, such a
recommendation is tantamount to a decision, and although the
recommendation may be discussed and the president may change
his mind, the directors never reverse him. A reversal would be
taken as a vote of no confidence, and his resignation would be
on the table forthwith. In other companies, the executive officer
encourages the board of directors to come to its own decision
on the matters that are its proper concern, for example, on the
declaration of a dividend. The officer may advise the board what
he as an individual would do, but he has no feeling of chagrin or
embarrassment if the board, after talking it over, feels differently.
The directors of a company are persons of considerable im-
portance in rule-making powers of a business. Consequently, it
is a matter of some interest how the members of a board of
directors are chosen and how they are continued in office. At
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this point, the form and the substance of the location of power
in business are far apart.
The form of election of directors is a quasi-democratic pro-
cedure for the affirmation of the delegation of power to candi-
dates for election and re-election. The procedure accepts on prin-
ciple the assumption that the final power over business rule-mak-
ing resides in the owners of the property, and that the larger the
relative ownership the larger the right to express preference for
the individuals to whom delegated powers should be assigned.
Without raising questions as to these assumptions, it is fair to
note that in substance the selection of directors does not conform
to the intention that the election procedure implies. The fact is
that the stockholders elect the directors but they do not choose
them. They are chosen by the board of directors itself, which
makes the nomination.
The reason for this lack of correspondence of form and sub-
stance rests on two practical considerations: (1) the stockholders
cannot choose directors because they are not organized as a po-
litical body in a way to make their franchise elective; (2) real
choice of directors by stockholders would be an extremely costly
and disruptive procedure, damaging to efficient management, to
business profits, and to the interests of the stockholders them-
selves. The stockholders have invested their savings in a bus-
iness to make profits and income, not to assert rights in the dele-
gation of power. They do not want to be organized politically as
stockholders; they want to be let alone. In this, the management
agrees with them. The occasional crisis situation can be ignored,
since the political organization of stockholders to oust a man-
agement is generally so crude as a technique of obtaining stock-
holder consensus that it is little more than a caricature of the
"democratic" procedure it purports to be.
III. TnE Locus oF PowER.
We have not been able to put our finger on the exact point
of final power in a company, but we have narrowed its location
down to the board of directors and the two principal officers, the
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chairman and the president. Within the circle of directors and
principal officers, the locus of power differs in different companies
and the same company from time to time. Sometimes it changes
even in the same meeting on different issues. If the chairman or
president is an extremely strong or self-willed individual, he
holds the reins in a firm hand. He may use the members of his
board of directors as a sounding board, as a source of advice,
as a means of access to influence in quarters outside his own
company. But the most dominating governor is likely to pause
if three or more directors differ audibly with his decision. The
next time it may be three other directors who differ, and the
time after that another three. Minorities are helpless alone, but
several minorities may mean a revolt. Whenever ownership and
management are held by different people, it can never be said
that the board of directors does not matter. The locus of power
may, for a moment or on a particular issue, be held by a single
director. Generally this occurs when a strong will holds a nega-
tive opinion. It is rare that a single individual on a board of
directors can get positive action taken contrary to the wishes of
the officers.
The decisions that must be made by a company require that
a final source of authority be instantly available. Accordingly,
an executive committee, with power to act for the board of direc-
tors between meetings, is set up; and in this committee, the de-
tails of questions of policy and operations are examined. Many
decisions are made by the executive committee that need only be
referred to the board for information and ratification. Included
in the membership of the executive committee, there will be one
or more of the executive officers of the company.
The power element in a company is more nearly an area
than a point, a pattern within the executive committee. It shifts
within the boundaries of the board of directors, the executive
committee, and senior officers. Sometimes the focus is sharp,
sometimes it is blurred. It may include one combination of per-
sonalities at one time, another at another. Power in a company
within this area seems to go to him who wants it and is able to
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exercise it. For the effectiveness of the company in doing the
things that a company is supposed to do, this shifting character
of the locus of power is desirable. It keeps an administration
from becoming too brittle. It creates a narrow circle where there
is a normal and healthy competition for internal status and rec-
ognition. Carried too far, such competition can be destructive to
united efforts, but ordinarily the influence of the board as a
whole moderates the intensity of personal ambitions and divisive
tendencies. When the board itself divides, and continues a divi-
sion over a period of time, again a pathological condition exists
that is harmful to the business.
From this circle of the board of directors and the two prin-
cipal officers come the rules, the instructions, and the delegation of
specific responsibility, the provision of means and the outlines
of ways. Here is found the coordination of the parts and of
partial efforts. Within this circle the character of the company
takes form; into it come experience, inspiration, and criticism
from the organization as a whole; and from it flow judgments
which give back to the organization direction and discipline.
A. IS A BOARD OF DIRECTORS GOOD ENOUGH?
Considering the central position of the board of directors as
an institution, not only in the government of a single business but
in the government of business generally, it is in its present form
an inadequate instrument of power. It is a vestigial remain from
a time when investors paid attention to their businesses and when
offensive and defensive alliances in business were the order of
the day. The most that can be said for the board of directors as
it exists today is that it provides an arena in which the ablest,
most powerful, and most persistent members of the board can
generally have their way. Such men have the traits that make
businesses successful, and their survival in the shifting locus of
power in a company means that they survive not only for their
own good, but for the good of the company too. The board of
directors tends to screen the fit from the unfit, and to that extent
to provide the rule of the fit for the conduct of the business.
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Need anything be done ? If the board of directors is a ves-
tigial and obsolete institution, sooner or later it will disappear
in its present form. This disappearance may come by transfor-
mation or it may come by collapse. Collapse is a clumsy and un-
certain way of moving from yesterday into tomorrow. Trans-
formation gives an apportunity to consider the question of what
is wanted and to choose the preferred method of getting from here
to there.
B. WHAT DO WE WANT?
What is it that we want in a board of directors? First, we
want a rule-making body superior to the executive officers that
will contribute to the efficiency of the business. Second, we want
a rule-making body that is sensitive to the interests of all who are
affected by the company as a private government.
When we examine these interests, a curious fact appears.
The interests of the four parties at interest are in part identical
in that each of them benefits by an efficient, well-managed, growing
business. For the stockholders this means the possibility of
larger dividends and a higher market price for their stock. For
the vendors it means a better outlet and prompt payment for the
things they supply. For the customer it means better service,
better quality, and a wider range of products from which to
choose. For the employee it means steadier employment, higher
pay, and better conditions of work. But at any given level of
activity and efficiency of a business, the interests of the four
groups of the governed are in conflict. At a given level of activity,
higher dividends can come only from lower prices to vendors,
higher prices to customers, or lower labor costs. Vendors can get
better consideration only at the expense of stockholders, cus-
tomers, or employees. Customers must pay higher prices if the
desires of stockholders, vendors, and employees are to be met,
and the employees can improve their earnings only at the expense
of the other three parties at interest. A board of directors, there-
fore, has a double task, first, to provide the company with an
efficient, aggressive management, and second, to make sure that
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at any given level of activity and efficiency, the groups at interest,
whose interests are necessarily in conflict, get a square deal.
C. TWO IMPRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
There have been two suggestions as to how the several parties
at interest in the operations of a company might be effectively
heard. One suggestion is that each of these groups should be rep-
resented by directors of their own choosing. The other is that
there should be a "public" director on the directing board, an
appointee of the Securities and Exchange Commission or of some
other public agency. Neither suggestion meets the requirements
of the situation in more than a formal way, and both should be
rejected as unrealistic and undesirable.
The idea of representation of parties at interest other than
stockholders appeals to those who are attracted by the machinery
of republican democracy, and who would extend it to all fields
where discipline and order make it necessary to have rule-makers
and rules. The fact is that no group can be represented by an
elected agent unless it has been organized to express itself politi-
cally. It must have a sense of common interest and a willingness
to take the trouble at an appointed time and place to assert the
privileges of an electorate. There must be understanding, not
only of issues, but of the capacity of the person who stands for
election. Sound choice requires elaborate procedural arrange-
ments, opportunities for discussion and information, candidates,
nominations, and campaigns. The necessary conditions cannot be
established in practice for stockholders; nor can they be estab-
lished for employees if we include employees of every rank and
skill; nor can they be made to function for customers or vendors.
A scheme of representation of these interests would be a travesty
on democratic procedures. It would result in business political
gangsterism that would destroy the efficiency of business manage-
ment. It would inject, into circles requiring the most intimate con-
fidence, individuals whose reliability was uncertain and whose
motives and ambitions would be in doubt. A board elected in such
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a manner would be injurious to the true welfare of the four groups
who have an interest in the success of the business.
The second idea, that of "public" directors, appointed by
some designated public agency, appeals to some who distinguish
only two parties at interest in a business: one, the owners; the
other, the general public. But in reality there are four parties at
interest, not two. In some matters these four interests are the
same and in other matters they are in conflict. No "public" rep-
resentation on a directing board could meet the essential require-
ments of this rule-making situation. The special and specific
interests of a company's stockholders, its vendors, its customers,
and its employees justify the creation of an opportunity for
expression, but it is they, not an undifferentiated public, that
should be heard by the company's rule-making authority.
D. ONE MODEST STEP
If we reject these two methods for broadening the composi-
tion of a corporate board of directors, what suggestion can beproposed? No drastic or universally applied scheme of altering
the composition of boards of directors should be contemplated.
The situations in different companies call for different measures,
or perhaps in some companies for none at all. Further in modi-
fying an agency like a board of directors, it is a good thing to take
a step at a time, to let adjustment and habit build familiArity with
the new, and then move forward with knowledge and conviction
that the direction is the right one.
Accordingly, my suggestion is, as a first step, that one director
be elected or re-elected and that he be asked to act as "trustee"
for one of the three parties at interest, other than the stock-
holders. Such director-trustee might be assigned the interests of
either the customers, or the vendors, or the employees, depending
on the nature of the company's business. He would be the nominee
of the management and of the existing board of directors and
would be elected in the usual way by the owners of the company,
the stockholders. During the experimental period of whatever
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length, no public announcement would need to be made that such
a policy had been adopted. In a formal sense little is changed,
but an important difference would occur in the deliberations of
the board. Let us suppose that this first director-trustee has been
asked to act for the customers of the company. Although he
owes his nomination to his fellow directors, and his election to the
stockholders, nevertheless he has accepted a trusteeship-a
trusteeship which has been created voluntarily by those choosing
him so to act as trustee. Now as be sits on the board, the inter-
ests of the customers of the company are his single interest. It
is his duty to know what these interests are and to see to it that
they are considered when matters affecting them are decided upon.
Such a director-trustee should be chosen for his ability to make
another's case his own. The one limitation that should be observed
is that there should be no conflict of interest in the individual
director himself; for example, a large stockholder should not be
chosen as trustee for the interests of customers. The director-
trustee should have time to work on his job and to think about it.
His duties would not require his full time, but they would involve
more application of effort than does the conventional director-
ship. Such a director should be properly compensated for the
service he performs.
If the first director-trustee works out usefully, the next step
would be a director-trustee for each of the other interests-all
depending on the nature of the company and whether the groups
are important enough in the particular case to warrant specialized
consideration. In this way, three of the four parties at interest
will have someone designated to speak for them. Presumably the
stockholders, -the fourth party, will be the concern of the remain-
ing directors. But to make sure that equally thoughtful attention
will be given to all the stockholders, one director should be explic-
itly charged with responsibility for all ownership interests and
be paid for taking the time required in doing so.
The board of directors would then consist of four paid direc-
tor-trustees, the chairman and the president, and such other
officers and directors as the needs and traditions of the company
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dictated. Under such a directing board, the interests of the gov-
erned will be at least represented and the actions of the com-
pany's administrative officers will take place in a frame of refer-
ence where the interests of all will have been heard. The four
director-trustees would sit, not as "representatives" of the inter-
est for which they speak, but as designees of their fellow directors
to give particular attention to their trustee assignments. Since
in any case these four special directors would be interested, even
from the standpoint of their special interest, in the growth and
prosperity of the corporation, and would be individually and
collectively only a minority of the board as a whole, it seems im-
probable that the divisive interest thus deliberately built into
the board at a low level of power but at a high level of articulate
responsibility would be harmful in any way to a clear-cut and
effective corporate program.
E. NEED ANYTHING BE DONE?
The question will arise, need anything be done at all? Granted
that the customers, the vendors, and the employees do have an
interest in the kind of business rules to which they are asked
to conform, they have no present rights in the matter. The stock-
holders have the rights; if they do not choose to exercise them,
that is their right as well. Meanwhile, the business goes on meet-
ing on every side the test of competition, and preserving its
authority as long as the governed consent to the rules that are
imposed. A policy of doing nothing usually seems to be the
prudent policy at any particular time for any particular group
of people. Yet, after something has gone wrong, in retrospect
it is possible to see that adjustment to the times and circum-
stances would have preserved a continuity of experience and
tradition which, though modified, would not have been dissipated.
In considering whether business should do anything to give
a voice to interests other than those who have rights to express
themselves, we must remember that each business derives its
power and its form from public government in which all these
"interests" do have "rights." If these interests some day want
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new rights in the government of business, they can be acquired
through orderly public legislative processes.
Today the obvious interests of the several parties subject to
business government are not properly safeguarded under the
present form of control of business power. Since they are not,
someone will some day, perhaps at a most inconvenient time, make
it his crusade to turn these interests into rights. If, before this
happens, the interests of all parties are protected by business
itself, it is unlikely that formal intervention would occur on
grounds of abstract political theory.
The reasons for taking steps to modernize the boards of di-
rectors of companies are reasons of efficiency, prudence, and
justice. Fortunately, there is no critical situation that presses
for action, but unfortunately there is under such circumstances
an understandable hesitancy about altering existing and known
power relationships. However, the mere passing of time brings
with it the necessity for specific changes in the personnel of a
board of directors. These occasions, if used to a purpose, may
lead to the transformation of the central agency of corporate
power so that it represents more nearly the interests of those
whom business governs.
IV. SAFEGUARDING THE Loc s OF POWER.
Because business has become one of the most pervasive facts
of life, the operations of business have acquired a political as well
as an economic significance in the lives of ordinary citizens. The
locus of this political and economic power is in corporate manage-
ment. We have depended on enterprise and competition as our
methods of placing business powers where they are presently
found. These methods have proved on the whole successful as far
as economic development is concerned, but they alone are inade-
quate to meet the newer responsibilities of business. Corporate
management, being the locus of business rule-making, has the
opportunity to initiate the transformations that will conserve
the successes of private business government and that at the same
time will safeguard the community from abuses in the exercise of
private power.
